The Navy force planning exercise began immediately after independence when John Blackket submitted a proposal to the then Prime Minister of India, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, seeking a force level of 142 ships centered around 2 aircraft carriers. This Fleet, in effect, would proxy the Royal Navy which was destined to withdraw from Asia in the coming years. Given the political dispensation and the ‘ahimsa’ driven idealism of the Post World War 2 period the plan we neither approved or rejected. Post the Sino-India 1962 war and to an extent the 1965 Indo-Pak wars the harsh reality possibly dawned upon the Indian foreign policy and security establishment that ahimsa and vasudeva kutambikam was only idealism and could be practiced in ashrams but was not particularly useful in the conduct of foreign policy especially in a belligerent neighbourhood.
The Navy continued to labour on its own and despite no specific policy inducted the HMS Achilles (INS Vikrant), pre-owned seaplanes, cruisers, destroyers and frigates from the United Kingdom. Slowly but surely the Indian Navy transformed from being a ‘Buyers Navy’ In the interregnum as the UK lost interest in India, the Navy inducted about 60 Soviet built warships, 5 LR MRASW aircraft and a dozen Ka-25/Ka-28 helicopters, 8 Foxtrot Class submarines and leased one nuclear submarine, by 1987. Concurrently Indian began building its own warships beginning with the humble Seaward Defence Boat in 1961 to the Godawari Class by 1986. By 1989, the Indian Navy had become a potent force in the region with two aircraft carriers, powerful missile destroyers, frigates, corvettes, submarines, LR MRASW aircraft and one nuclear submarine. It earned itself a place on the TIME Magazine cover which featured the Indian built Godavari Class – one of the most powerful warships of that age – on its cover. The Indian Navy has indeed arrived as a potent force in the region with capability to build its own warships and the HDW submarines.
Subsequently, as the maritime scenario evolved the growth plan was revisited on various occasions. A new fleet of 8 Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft (Tu 142), Short Range Reconnaissance and EW aircraft (Do-228) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Together with a cleverly conceived plan of integrating satellites – both communication and navigation – creation of networks and expansion of infrastructure facilities the Navy became increasingly self-reliant. Indian shipyards were entrusted with complicated projects and complex warships requiring integration of sensors, weapons, propulsion systems from across the world. The Navy also developed great capability in System Integration and design of Combat Management Systems.
In 2006 the Navy, in a departure from its threat based approach towards force level structuring, adopted a capability based perspective plan called the Maritime Capability Perspective Plan to help it guide its modernisation strategy and would be best suited to meet the requirements of the National Maritime interest without being threat specific or nation agnostic. This concept has become the bedrock on which the Indian Navy’s induction of ships submarines, aircrafts satellites etc have been pursued. It is another matter that the Defence Procurement Procedure virtually derailed the capability building process as approvals.
The assumptions which went into designing the future force structure of the Navy developed from the Indian maritime doctrine of 2004 and thereafter continuously improved over a period of time with various other documents the Indian Navy prepared by itself and in partnership with the National Maritime Foundation and other strategic studies think tanks.
Whilst the core principles of security safety regional stability and sovereignty over owned seas and to exercise freedom of navigation over the high seas have remained sacrosanct but the players and their profiles have dramatically changed in the last few years which is now resulting in a situation where clear dominance of the Indian Navy in the area of interest and the area of influence is now being contested by extra regional powers.
For several decades it was a given that the Indian Ocean region and the SLOCs that transited here comprised the soft underbelly of China in the sense that it carried the majority of its requirements of hydrocarbons, commodities ores and trade goods and was vulnerable to interdiction. But, today there is a huge and highly transformational reversal. The soft underbelly of China in the Indian Ocean region has transformed into a very powerful and muscular 6-pack stomach. The Indian security establishment, by all intents and purposes, have not recognised this latent power in the Indian backyard yet or have not given it the attention it deserves.
When combined with a clear intention to put that muscle to use this makes it the foremost security threat to India. Chinese muscularity is so visible and its replication across the Indo-Pacific region has caused so much concern that an unprecedented alliance of 4 nations, viz., Australia India Japan and the United States (QUAD) has taken shape which was virtually unthinkable even a year ago.
Reasons for this new alignment of forces can be seen to be originating in the ‘manner’ and ‘character’ in which the PLA Navy has grown in the last few years. I recall exercising with a PLAN ship and their lack of professionalism left me aghast. But, today having conducted training exercises with the professional navies of India, Australia, France, Russia etc for two decades the PLAN has become a competence force and in that way, potentially, the Indian Navy has trained its foremost adversary to fight professionally.
Apart from the growth of the PLAN the overall strategic plan of China is to locate replenishment, repair and logistic support bases in states where there is substantial economic dependence on China. These bases span across from the West Coast of Africa, up North to the Horn of Africa, thence East across the Makaran Coast and into Myanmar. These permanent establishments provides local jobs and economic benefits to the population and provides the PLAN with very long sea legs as a quid pro quo.
Couple these with the advances China has made in the technology sphere. These include satellite based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, deployment of People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) vessels which number about 15000 Distant Water Fishing Vessels (DWFV) supported by Reefers and equipped with military grade radar and communication equipment. The militarised fishing fleet can swarm into the paths of Fleets and report their movements from nearly all corners of the world as this Militia operate as far away as South America, Africa and further South to the distant waters of Antarctica and the islands in that region.
Closer home the China’s ‘homeland’ defence eco-system has been built around a powerful arsenal of anti-access and anti-denial weapons to bring ‘targets’ upto 1000 Nm under the assured direct fire power of land based, road mobile carrier killer ballistic missiles and anti surface ballistic missiles such as Df 21 D & DF 26 which have a range of 4000 kilometres. Advances in hypersonics, satellite based synthetic aperture radar providing wide area surveillance systems, digitisation, networkisation and informationalisation combined with AI provides added challenges since the potential opponents have no defence against any of these new systems and technologies.
The Chinese have developed a highly potent expeditionary fleet which is second to none today. First, the PLAN operates a fleet of 8 SSBNs, 13 SSNs and about 55 conventional submarines including twenty Type 039A AIP equipped submarines with sub-launched cruise missile, torpedoes and mines. China built 12 nuclear submarine in 15 years and its shipyards can combine to deliver two new conventional submarines every year even in a BAU scenario which obviously can be ramped up as the supply chain and vendor base is home grown. This is a tremendous capability which is unmatched in the world.
As regards the aircraft carrier program its achievements are, to say the least, fantastic. The Liaoning procured from Ukraine, as scrap. was converted to a training carrier in a matter of years and commissioned into service in 2012. The Shandong, was completely designed and built in China in 6 years and entered service in 2019. The construction of the 3rd aircraft carrier, Type 003 with electric propulsion, electromagnetic launch a CATOBAR system and to a much larger and a new design, began in 2015/16 and will enter service later this year in an astounding time span of less than 6 years ! Going by their phenomenal capacity of ship construction it should be possible to have the 4th aircraft carrier, Type 004, also sailing the high seas by 2026. In this time, the JF-20, the Chinese designed and built fifth generation plus fighter aircraft, would replace the existing JF-15 derived from the Su-33 Russian design presently flying from these carriers.
So far as destroyers are concerned sixteen Type 055, the latest in the series with displacement greater than 10,000 tons, began construction in 2016. The first of class was commissioned in 2020 and all 16 new destroyers would enter service by 2022. Chinese shipyards have demonstrated capability to deliver 8 destroyers in 6 years and cumulatively have produced 40 destroyers in 30 years, which includes the Type 052 and Type 052D which are the Chinese equivalent of the US Aegis Class.
As regards frigates, China constructed 30 Type 054 frigates in 11 years. These are fairly large frigates at 4000 tons and are capable of operating with the carrier battle group or launching independent surface action operations. Far local naval defence, Type 056 corvettes of 1500 tons are constructed in 4 shipyards concurrently and in 6 years, 42 Jiangdao class corvettes have been added to the PLAN fleet.
For Expeditionary warfare, the PLAN have commenced work on the new generation Type 076 assault carrier that would embark UCAVs, UAVs, Hovercrafts, helicopters and with the provision of EMAL driven catapult system. However , there is not enough Internet information on the fixed wing element on these type 076 assault carriers.
Many research reports have concluded that the Chinese Navy would be larger than 425 ships and submarines by 2030. By some estimates, PLA Navy has added more than 117 platforms to the fleet in 15 years. Providing for its requirements of countering Taiwan, Japan and the US in the Pacific ocean it would still have a surplus to deploy a 1 or 2 100,000 DWT aircraft carriers embarked with 80-120 JF-20 fighters, 30-45 Helicopters and possibly several dozens of UAVs and UCAVs. The carrier forces would be accompanied by an young fleet of average age of 7-8 years, comprising 8-10 SSBNs/SSNs, 30-40 conventional submarines, 20-24 large Destroyers, 30-36 frigates and two Type 076 NG assault ships. This translates into a minimum firepower of 600-800 SSMs, 1000-1200 SAMs, 200-250 Ship Launched Heavy Anti-Submarine Torpedoes, 100-150 Sub launched cruise missiles, 200-250 anti ship torpedoes, perhaps 12-28 ballistic missiles, several 100s of air launched anti-ship missiles, PGMs and torpedoes and lacs of artillery rounds. Such a force would also benefit from the Space based ISR and communications assets. This is more than sufficient to decimate the Indian Navy 3 times over and still be left with surplus to deal with any remaining elements of the QUAD in the Indo-Pacific and a fresh Chinese version of the ‘rule based order’ in the Indo-Pacific can be possible by 2026. Further asymmetry is possible by China leveraging its skill sets in the cyber space as well
China’s ability to deploy such a massive force of this dimension and character in the Indian Ocean region no longer makes the region the soft underbelly of China. Working in tandem with spaced based AI driven ISR, swarms of Fishing militia and logistics and repair facilities spread across North Indian Ocean and the East Coast of Africa, the PLA Navy can remain deployed for several months as a Fleet in Being in the Indo-Pacific. Such a Fleet combined with the Fortress Fleet positioned in proximity of the choke points can not only ensure the unchallenged security of its own SLOCs in the region vital for China’s continued economic growth but also aggressively interfere in these very SLOCs of India, Japan and Australia with a combination of military and monetary diplomacy to completely shut them down. The PLAN has truly imbibed the lessons of Alfred Mahan and incorporated it in its strategic thinking.
To further ensure the Chinese version of the ‘rule based order at sea’, the PLAN also has the latent capability to lay mines in the entrance channels of all the major ports of India using its conventional fleet of submarines. With each submarine carrying at a minimum of 16-24 mines from its total arsenal of 50,000 sea mines and assuming a passage of a week or two from the nearest ‘overseas’ logistics base the entire operation of mining Indian ports can be completed in less than 3 months which would be the ‘pre-operations’ of the impending conflict.
Together with interdiction of the SLOCs and mining of the major ports would completely disrupt India’s supply chains of hydrocarbons including CNG used in energy and transportation to the West, block the access to metallurgical grade and cooking coal coming in from Indonesia and Australia in the East and stop transhipments from Dubai, Singapore and Colombo from different ports across the world. These trades are the bedrock of India economy and it’s warfighting abilities.
Against this powerful PLAN fleet, the best ORBAT that the QUAD grouping could bring to bear is :
Japan. 1 helicopter carrier, 10-15 destroyers and frigates of the JMSDF as the main fleet would mostly see operations in the littoral regions of Japan or combined with the US 7th Fleet for defence of Japan and Taiwan. Therefore, no support from the JMSDF in the Indian Ocean may be expected. At most a few of the older P3Js may be made available but their ability to survive PLAN modern firepower is questionable.
Australia. The RAN may only be able to provide 5-7 destroyers and frigates, a few LR MRASW aircraft and one helicopter carrier.
- Given it’s pre-committed responsibilities with regard to Japan, Taiwan and South Korea the 7th Fleet would be fully committed to the Pacific Ocean. At best, some elements of the Third Fleet could be redeployed for operations from its present responsibilities in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. The US as the extra regional power in the Indo-Pacific may not be able to deploy a balancing force to maintain peace and stability in the region given its commitments in the Pacific, Gulf Europe and elsewhere. Moreover, the PLAN seems sanguine that it has the capability to challenge this force which may cause further hesitation in deploying assets in a confrontation which if lost would permanently relegate the US to second place. Potentially, space based ISR capabilities and long range UCAVs maybe made available.
India. At best the Indian Navy would be able to put together one aircraft carrier, a total of 15-18 destroyers and frigates, 5-6 conventional submarines, 2 SSNs, 8-10 LR MRASW aircraft and a few UAVs. The balance of the Indian Navy’s fleet would not be able to survive a few hours of operations and may only be restricted to ’Local Naval defence’. With no minesweeping capabilities the Indian Navy would not be able to clear the mines laid by Chinese submarines and consequently the entire EXIM commerce would be disrupted, creating massive shortages of hydrocarbons and coal which may shut down the majority of India’s coal and oil fired power plants apart from several other downstream disruptions including civil unrest spurred by Maoists and LWE funded by China.
Other nations ranging from the Middle East and North Africa nations to the ASEAN community are unlikely to provide any direct support to India given their massive economic dependencies on China and of course couched diplomatically on the principle of ‘centrality of neutrality’ and non-interference in ‘internal affairs’. France and the United Kingdom may provide some support but that may be more diplomatic than military.
This combined force of the QUAD would be stretched between Australia and East Coast of Africa and would still be only about 30% of the PLAN ORBAT deployable in the IOR.
This asymmetry will continue to remain in China’s favour as the Chinese defence budget is already about 5 times the Indian defence budget and is growing at about 7 to 8% per year and accounts for almost 36% of central government expenditure. QUAD partners in the region, have a combined budget of less than 100 billion dollars and growing at less than 3 to 4% per year and all powers have external dependencies for ammunitions.
Given this gigantic PLAN in the Indian Ocean region and China’s known tendency of exercising all aspects of national power and suasion in a highly coordinated and integrated manner it is entirely within the realm of possibility that China will succeed in deterring countries to engage with India and supplying war materiel without even firing a shot against the Indian Navy till issues are ‘settled’ to Chinese version of the ‘rule based order’.
This is feasible for the Chinese who can be certain to coerce nations by very strong messaging that any attempts to supply resources and commodities to India would attract a very high cost including loss of ship and cargo and ‘sanctions’. Recalling that less than 6% of EXIM cargo is carried on Indian owned or flagged ships and only about 40% of coastal cargo is carried on Indian ships the implications of such a move should be apparent to anybody. Further, many of the shipping lines carrying Indian EXIM cargo are operated or owned by Chinese companies and hence persuading them to carry Indian cargo would be well-nigh impossible. Because of the governments past lacklustre approach and lack of a strategic recognition by the governments ‘economists’ lobby of the necessity for marine shipbuilding, the geo-political penalties for not building a national capacity, capability and skill sets in shipping and shipbuilding will now expose India to these preventable circumstances.
China is not a benign power and certainly not entitled to be part of the mantra of Vasudeva Kutambikam, as enunciated by Sri Pranab Mukherjee in 2008 and repeated on different locations and occasions by different political leaders in Parliament and elsewhere as the core of India’s foreign policy. The words come from the mantra in Maha Upanishad which belongs to the Samaveda tradition. Over a period of time these words has been used in Indian ancient literature such as the Hitopadesha, Panchatantra, Vikram-charitra etc. Interests invariably overshadow values which are compromised to achieve realpolitik goals.
China has never been a benign power and has been an usurper and marauder of many nations in their chequered past and India too has been a victim of Chinese aggression for ages. India also needs to note the obvious belligerence displayed by the Chinese delegation who completely breached protocol and diplomatic etiquettes at the recent Alaska summit – an indication of their new character. The US Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks stated that “Threatening neighbours in the Pacific region and using predatory economic practices, Beijing represents a threat to regional peace and stability, and to the rules based international order on which our security and prosperity rests”. India must be fully forewarned on these designs and a naive and trusting foreign policy with its attendant disregard for the security implications has to be revisited.
Going by historical precedent the Chinese are unlikely to negotiate with India on equal terms. The northern and north eastern borders may be turbulent but no escalation beyond a battalion level encounter is likely since this directly draws international attention, causes collateral damage, aggravates further dislike for China and worse may not be settled without massive escalation between a professional Indian Army and a conscript PLA. Instead, to achieve the desired political objective of ‘teaching India a lesson’ the preferred strategy would be to exploit what India has so far considered to be its once weak underbelly which has since transformed to a very muscular 6-pack in forcing a settlement without firing a shot well outside public view and media glare.
Therefore, we are faced with the stark reality with a situation where the PLA Navy has grown to such a potent force in two decades that it can interfere, at will, with not only national security but the very economic foundations of our country. This reality must make a very strong case for revisiting our foreign policy, our trade and commerce policies and warfighting doctrines and strategy to overcome this rather dismal future that we face. Whilst an arms race is in nobody’s interest succumbing to China’s PLAN is even less in the national interest. Therefore, we need to define the Navy we need.
However, whilst we must toe the ‘party line’ of the great achievements of our defence shipyards in building India’s Navy they in reality pale in comparison with the achievements of other Asian shipyards. If it is any comfort, it is only the US shipyards who can beat us on time and cost over runs in shipbuilding. Whist the history of the earlier shipbuilding projects are too disheartening to chronicle again and they are available in public documents such as the SCOD or CAG Reports even the recent shipbuilding programs do not instil confidence. In force structuring the future Navy, emphasis continues to remain on the 7500 km long coastline and the 2.2 million sq km as the basis for determining the Navy requirements. But the truth is that the Navy has to ensure SLOC security, safety, stability and sovereignty on an infinitely larger geo-political arena spanning from the East Coast of Africa to the waters of Australia.
The IAC Imbroglio
After almost two decades of ‘examination’ the aircraft carrier project IAC-I, finally received formal government approval in January 2003. The keel was laid in February 2009 and the ship launched on 12 August 2013. Seven years later only the basin trials were completed. The ship is expected to enter service by early 2022. The fact is that CSL has taken 18 years and an escalation of INR 3000 crs to deliver one 40,000 tonne aircraft carrier. We need to reflect if this a matter of national pride or does it call for serious introspection of our defence production organisation or project management structures.
The case for the IAC-II is equally grim. This Project commenced in 2011 and even after 10 years the staff requirements are yet to be frozen. Various reports suggest that it may be a nuclear powered 70,000 DWT carrier at an estimated cost of INR 70-80,000 crores. It is unlikely to enter service before 15 years from the date of final approval since it would be ‘nominated’ to be built by CSL whose record is hardly inspiring. Given the present circumstances there is no merit in further experimenting and procrastinating to find the best aircraft carrier for the Navy.
The ‘good enough solution’ simply lies in building two more Vikrant class, for the same cost as one 70,000 tonne nuclear powered aircraft carrier and in half the time provided it is simultaneously built in CSL and a private shipyard whilst the fourth aircraft carrier would be assigned to the shipyard that delivers better on cost and quality. The air element may require the Navy to continue with the MiG 29KuB/LCA(N) the Ka-31 and the Sikorsky MH 60D helicopters being procured under the GtG route and these must be contracted concurrently. Given the consolidated requirements for 2 aircraft carriers and the additional land based training squadrons there is adequate critical mass to locate manufacturing of these aircraft and UAVs in India. The budgetary support sought for the two carriers and the embarked air wing could be of the order of INR 110,000 crores over 10-12 years.
Submarines
A 30 year submarine building plan was approved by the cabinet committee on security in 1999 soon after the Kargil conflict. The plan was to induct 12 diesel submarines by 2012 and another 12 submarines by 2030. Against this plan the situation is as follows:-
- A contract was signed with MDL in 2005 for building 6 submarines under the P-75 program with the first submarine to be inducted in 2012 and subsequent submarines at intervals of 6 months each with program completion planned for 2016. Of this contract, only 3 submarines have been inducted so far and the balance 3 submarines may only be commissioned by 2023 causing a time over run of 7 years. There is no public documentation available on the cost over runs of this project but informal estimate suggests that it could be about 30%.
- As per the submarine building plan, the balance 6 of the 12 submarines to be inducted by 2012 has seen no constructive progress except that these will be built under the strategic partnership route. Given the well know efficiencies of the system, contracting itself may take upto 2024 with the first of class, going by the MDL experience, entering service in 2028 and project completion not earlier than 2033.
- Therefore in 30 years whilst the Navy should have got all its 24 submarine it would only be able to acquire 10 submarines. This is a dismal failure of the system
- MDL colossal failure to build these submarines in the contracted time and cost should ordinarily be punished. Instead, as a PIB release dated 19-September-2019 the Department of Defence Production claims credit for this performance of delivering by grandly stating that “The Scorpene project would not have been achieved up to the current progress without the unconditional support and active encouragement of the Department of Defence Production (MoD).”
- Given the extreme gravity of the PLAN threat in the Indo-Pacific this business as usual approach would be disastrous. Without further ado, the Navy must immediately order another 12 follow-on modified P-75 submarines with AIP on MDL for delivery within 10 years. Maximum outsourcing to private shipyards, adopting modular fabrication, outfitting using digital twins technology and a state of the art AI enabled project management system is a must to reduce the build period. This program must have single point of responsibility and carried out in mission mode directly by the Indian Navy and MDL under a professional management. Also, ‘unconditional support and active encouragement’ of the Dept of Defence Production and the Department of Defence Finance may be waived since there is no value addition by them. Concurrently, the weapons ‘systems’ package must be ordered with the caveat that all ‘ammunition’ elements will be built in India – preferably as a JV with an Indian entity- private or public.
The P-75 (I) programme to build another 6 submarines has seen many twists and turns with retraction of RFPs included and now is being pursued in the Strategic Partnership Model with MDL and L&T being the shortlisted Indian entities in this project worth an estimated INR 50,000 crores. First and foremost, the numbers must be enhanced to a minimum of 18 P-75(I) submarines so that the Non-recurring costs of Design and Engineering, Jigs tools and Fixtures, Test equipment, skilling etc are amortised over 18 submarines and not over 6 submarines thereby reducing the acquisition cost per submarine by a sizeable percentage.
Second, the down selected FOEM partner would have to build initially 6 submarines each in MDL and the private sector shipyard at the L1 cost which is budgeted at INR 55,000 crores which appears on the lower side for a clean sheet 3000 t submarine. The balance 6 submarines would be awarded to the better performing shipyard on predefined metrics clearly excluding ‘active support and encouragement’ by department for defence production for MDL. The long-term goal should be to incrementally improve this project with new features and build an enduring pipeline submarine production model in two shipyards to together deliver one submarine every 4 months by 2027. The budgetary support required would be about INR 150,000 crores over the next 10 years.
Nuclear Submarines
India began its program for developing a completely indigenous nuclear submarine under the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) submarine program in 1983. The first of the four ATV submarines, the INS Arihant, was inducted in August 2016, thirty-three years later! The second, INS Arighat, may enter service in late 2021 whilst the other two equipped with the long-range K-4 (3,500 km) SLBMs are in varying stages of construction though media reports suggest that it may be inducted by 2024. Hence, India would have built 4 SSNs in forty one years compared to the Chinese shipyards building 12 SSNs/SSBNs in 15 years.
In March 2019, India and Russia signed a deal for the lease of another Akula-class nuclear submarine, Chakra-III, to India for 10 years which may be delivered to the Indian Navy by 2025. In the same year, the cabinet committee on security has also approved a programme to build six nuclear-powered attack submarines costing an estimated Rs 90,000 crores. This has not yet been contracted. This must be placed on the Vital List of defence procurements and undertaken once again in mission mode to deliver 6 nuclear submarines in 12 years. The budgetary support sought including the weapons package would be bout INR 110,000 crores over 12 years.
Destroyers.
The Project 15 and 15A ships is yet another grim story and its gory details need not be detailed here. Suffice to say that three Project 15 ships were built at a time and cost over run of about 6 years and Rs 7000 Crs. Three ships of Project 15A took 14 years to build and with considerable cost over runs too. Now four ships of the Project15 B class have been ordered at an over all cost of around ₹35,800 crore and this project would take 14 years until 2029 to complete. This slovenly pace of building destroyers with the ‘unconditional support and active encouragement of the Department of Defence Production’ will not be adequate to provide any confidence in bolstering fleet levels rapidly. Greater outsourcing and fully leveraging production concepts of ‘digital twin’ and adopting a highly modular build strategy may result in some compression in time. However, strategically it is a huge disadvantage to have only one shipyard tasked to build destroyers.
The private sector must be tapped to create a supplementary source. To be able to truly deliver the required force levels and build the indigenous eco-system an additional ten P15B destroyers should be ordered with 3 on MDL and the balance destroyers ordered on an Indian private sector shipyard at 10-15% higher than the price offered to MDL to allow for capex into infrastructure and with permissible price escalation as per a pre-approved formula.
An additional 10 destroyers should be added to the Fleet in 10 years from contracting. The budgetary support would be about INR 90,000 crores including the integral air element of 2 multi role helicopters and UAVs.
Frigates
The Indian Navy began its indigenous Frigate program with the license production of the Leander class in the late 1960s . This design was improved with the induction of the Taragiri class which was able to put a multi role helicopter on a frigate deck for the first time. Further improvement of the design resulted in the Godavari class followed by the construction of the Betwa class which were the first frigates with the ability to carry and operate 2 multirole helicopters from its deck but at the cost of stealth. The Project 17 class, approved in 1999, as the next generation frigate with stealth features, CODOG propulsion and completely new set of armament and sensors were next and 3 ships of this class took 13 years to deliver. Meanwhile in nearly the same period Russian shipyards delivered six Project 1135.6 ships in two lots by delivering the first 3 ships in 5 years and the second 3 ships, with Indian equipment, in 6 years. An additional four P1135.6 ships were ordered in 2018, with two each to be delivered by Yantar Shipyard, Russia and the other ‘nominated’ to GSL in India. Russian deliveries of two ships are contracted for completion in 4 years whilst the GSL deliveries of two ships will take 7 years from award of contract. Notably, GSL graduated from building Offshore Patrol Vessels and corvettes to frigates and can become the third shipyard in the Public Sector with capability to build complex frigates. The P 17A program comprises 7 frigates of which 4 ships are nominated to MDL and 3 ships to GRSE. The contract was signed in 2015 and deliveries are ‘planned’ to be commence in 2022 and complete before 2026 thereby inducting 7 ships in 12 years. The program cost is INR 58,000 Crores.
Even then the frigate force levels will only reach 20 frigates by 2024. To rapidly build the frigate force levels, firstly the order on GSL for two P 1135.6 frigates GSL should be increased to 10 frigates to be delivered by 2032. GRSE should be given orders for an additional 6 P17As as they have already launched all three P17As. A further order for 12 P 17A frigates should be placed on a private shipyard in a JV with MDL This would take up the force levels to 46 frigates by 2034 provided there is no further ‘unconditional support and active encouragement of the Department of Defence Production’ of our PSUs.
Fleet Support Ships
A contract for collaboration to design and build five fleet 45,000t support ships (FSS) for US $ 2.3bn contract was signed between Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL) and a Turkish consortium led by Anadolu shipyard in 2019. The first of class will be delivered in four years while the remaining will be delivered at intervals of ten months. It is unclear why technology for building a basic cargo vessel should require a foreign collaborator when the in-house capability exists to design and build aircraft carriers, submarines and destroyers exist? The contract is yet to be signed with HSL and even assuming this is concluded by end of 2021, extremely unlikely given the efficiencies of the system and more importantly no bdudget for new schemes, this force level basis the current build strategy would only be achieved by 2028 which is far too long. HSL must be encouraged to design to a build strategy that enables maximum modularity so that pre-outfitted ‘modules’ constructed by other shipyards are only integrated at HSL. All five FSS should enter service by 2026.
Smaller Ships
Smaller ships and Vessels. The Indian Navy placed contracts with CSL and Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers (GRSE) for the construction of 16 anti-submarine warfare shallow watercraft (ASW SWC) ships in May 2019 at a cost INR 18,000 crores. CSL and GRSE will build eight ships each, with deliveries expected to start from 2022. HSL was awarded a contract for 2 Nos Diving Support Vessels for an order value of about INR 2500 crs.
Mine Counter Vessels (MCMV). If there is one program that deserves the greatest opprobrium is the 2004 initiated MCMV project for acquisition of 24 such vessels. In an earlier article I have traced this project. Suffice it to say, with no minesweeping capability, the entire EXIM and coastal shipping is completely hostage to any country that can mine our Ports SAGARMALA, SAGAR and MAUSAM not withstanding. This strategic deficiency in force level planning has escaped the attention of naval planners. Once again, the best being the enemy of the good, functional MCMVs with contemporary technology should be inducted on the highest possible priority even ahead of nuclear submarines or aircraft carriers. Options to lease MCMVs should be actively considered to tide over the time to build new MCMVs which given the well known efficiencies of the system may take another 4 years before contracting. However, the key consideration must be that piecemeal orders are not be placed and one consolidated order for building all 24 MCMVs must be placed on 3 shipyards at the L1 price so that this vital constituent of national security is in place in no more than 5 years after contracting. An urgent procurement of MCMVs from Japan or Russia on a GtG basis should be processed to be able to clear mines laid in one major port at the very least.
Corvettes. Project 28 was approved in 2003 and all four corvettes of the Kamorta class were delivered by 2020. In effect it took 17 years to build 4 2000t corvettes. Remarkable to say the least! In August 2018, approval was accorded for procurement of six next-generation offshore patrol vessels (NGOPVs) and a RFI is under process for the next generation missile corvettes. Both programs must be combined and built on a common hull design by finding a suitable balance between the OPVs and the Corvettes. There is little point in having a multiplicity of designs and hull forms, Since the purpose of OPVs is local naval defence and ‘combat’ offshore patrol is the Navy’s part of ship having low weaponised platforms does not serve the intended purpose and hence such ships should be left with the Indian Coast Guard. Combining both projects into a consolidated program of building 24 corvettes mostly for the Island territories should be considered. This may entail a total investment of about INR 30,000 crores but would deliver excellent value for money and should be entirely built in two shipyards in the private sector. This program should be the mainstay of future LND and a pipeline production model with incremental improvements should be considered such that at least 4 corvettes per year are delivered commencing 2026.
In concluding this section a highly vigorous pace of shipbuilding is vitally required to restore strategic balance in the IOR and would serve to build a reasonable capability in a shorter time frame rather than find the perfect solution after the war at sea has been lost.
The greatest danger to shipbuilding comes from the ‘unconditional support and active encouragement of the Department of Defence Production’. It has been stated that the DPSUs have honed their skills to perfection in displacing private shipyards from competing for shipbuilding projects. “This strategy using of waiting in the wings, formal and informal access to corridors of power, exploiting benevolence of policymakers, defending critical gaps in quality or low productivity with futuristic promises, toying around ad-infinitum with ‘children of monopoly’ that derail or fall short of the services’ expectations, and then – at crucial decision points such as this – jumping to throw a spanner into the works, this is a time-tested, low-cost option often exercised by DPSUs and DRDO laboratories.” Source: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/voices/make-the-naval-utility-helicopter-an-example-of-atma-nirrbharta/
Be that as it may, there is little time to loose as a major calamity and huge disaster is looming ahead of us. Corrective action in mission mode is vitally required. The total outlay required to retain reasonable deterrence against the PLAN adds up to about INR 450,000 crores over 12 years which is only about INR 40,000 crores per year of additional CAPEX for the Navy. This is less than 1/1000th of the National GDP and is a very small price to pay to retain our sovereignty and integrity as a nation.
The second part of the series would address Naval Aviation.
By Commodore Sujeet Samaddar, NM (Retd)